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2 the investor of most or all of the commercial benefit that they expected from their investments. Indirect expropriation could take the form of a tax, licensing fee, or most notably for the purposes of this article an environmental regulation, such as that requiring that investors implement certain industrial safety precautions. In theory the extent to which such an obligation is unreasonable in the sense that the burden to the investor is disproportionate to the benefit to itself and society will dictate the extent of compensation that the host state must pay. Gauging the correct level of compensation for expropriation is a critical and often highly controversial exercise of investment tribunals constituted to assess liability and damages on the part of host states at the behest of injured foreign investors.
1 This article will offer innovative guidance in the approach to this process by investment arbitration tribunals by applying a formula, drawn from the field of risk prevention mathematics and rooted in cost-benefit analysis. This should offer much needed direction for adjudicators in the establishment of an objective, consistent and predictable approach to this important feature of dispute settlement in international investment law.
This article will begin by outlining the nature of claims that may be brought by foreign investors as a consequence of onerous environmental laws. It will then introduce the Disproportion Factor equation which can be used to calculate reasonable levels of expenditure. In part three this mathematical model will explain the point of indiscriminate decision and the permission point and how they can be used to define when the expenditure on environmental protection has become excessively disproportionate. A hypothetical example drawn from the nuclear energy industry will be described in the final section for the purposes of illustration.
II Regulatory Expropriation for Environmental Protection and Cost Benefit Analysis
Regulation in the forms of taxes, fees, licenses or other forms of governmental interference can diminish the profitability of the investment activity to the point that it has become effectively useless, from a commercial standpoint, and as such can be considered acts of expropriation even where they serve a legitimate social aim will lose 700 million euros from investments made in nuclear power plants, which were made on the understanding that their life spans would be extended by Germany.
5
The increasing environmental awareness of many governments and policy makers around the world suggests that measures enacted for these purposes will intensify. 6 In addition to the obvious potential for domestic litigation, over-zealous environmental regulatory activity could result in a greater number of claims brought by investors under international investment treaties and regional economic integration agreements, collectively termed international investment agreements ('IIA's), such as NAFTA and the ECT. While there are more than 3000 of these instruments in operation, 7 IIAs typically contain guarantees against expropriation without the payment of full compensation in addition to other protections such as a guarantee of Western investors sinking enormous costs in commercial projects in highly unstable developing countries, although such guarantees may be equally enforced against developed countries that had traditionally been capital exporters. As noted above, the obligation to pay compensation to injured investors is applicable notwithstanding the public purpose behind the value-diminishing regulation, such as whether the measure had an objective of environmental protection. As one investment tribunal emphasized:
Expropriatory environmental measures --no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a wholeare ... similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state's obligation to pay compensation remains.
11
Although the obligation to pay compensation for regulatory interference, such as those linked to environmental policies is well established, whether or not the measure constitutes an unreasonable interference worthy of compensation (as opposed to legitimate state action) as well as the manner in which the precise quantum of this compensation is calculated by arbitration tribunals is far from settled, in part due to 9 E.g. Art 6 of the US Model BIT 1994 and Art 1110.1 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ('NAFTA'). This is the so-called Hull Formula. 10 The so-called Hull Formula, see e.g. in addition to the negative financial impact of such actions or measures, the Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to determine if [the regulations] are to be characterized as expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the proportionality.
28
Assessing the proportionality between the financial harm suffered by the investor against the environmental gain to society was openly considered in the Total v Argentina 29 dispute. In deciding in favour of the investor and ordering compensation for expropriation, the tribunal examined an Argentine law which directed that levels of compensation for regulatory interference must take into account the extent of the burden placed upon the property owner:
General modifications to regulations and procedures related to . The phrase "extremely burdensome" is telling because it requires the national government and subsequently the arbitrator implementing the domestic law to assess not simply whether or not the environmental measure is financially injurious to the investor, but the extent to which that injury is out of proportion to the benefit it engenders, on the assumption that some degree of disproportion is acceptable.
The problem therefore becomes: how can arbitrators, appointed on an ad hoc basis and chosen by the parties, decide whether a particular expense incurred in the fulfilment of a regulatory obligation for the purposes of protecting the environment is out-of-proportion to the benefit it engenders? The answer will be tied to the costs suffered by the foreign investor, typically a firm engaging in some form of manufacturing or extraction, and the value received in terms of the prevention avoided. It will also engage an assessment of the investor's risk aversion. Thus in order to evaluate the reasonableness of the regulatory safeguard imposed by the host state, it must be determined whether or not a private individual would choose that course of action in the absence of the law given the costs and benefits that are entailed. Crucially this assessment hinges on the understanding that the decisionmaker, meaning the manager or owner of the firm in question that is considering whether or not to implement the precaution voluntarily, is choosing a course of action on the basis of rationality. A rationally informed decision by a private individual should be the benchmark by which reasonableness of regulatory precaution should be assessed, establishing whether or not the measure was an expropriation and if so, how much compensation is required. A reasonable expenditure on an environmental safeguard may be calculated as the ratio of the actual expenditure to the maximum that is reasonable for a protection system guarding against expected environmental costs. The concept of costs attempts to monetize what might be viewed more conventionally as economic injuries including those suffered by both the company and the region or ecosystem in which it is located. Such costs could consist of structural damage to a factory or plant, ground contamination, expenses in evacuating and potentially relocating people, agricultural yield losses, business disruption as well as loss of reputation, and even loss of beauty or pleasure, to the extent that this can be quantified. Other factors relevant to assessing these costs include pre-existing and remaining environmental hazards, the period that the protection system will operate and the growth rate of the organization 31 P. J. Thomas and R. D. Jones, 'Extending the J-value framework for safety analysis to include the environmental costs of a large accident' 88 Process Safety and Environmental Protection 297 (2010) or the foreign investment. A regulation imposed by a host state which necessitates that a foreign investor spend more than this amount as derived dictates should be viewed as unreasonable by an international investment arbitration tribunal and therefore indicative of a regulatory expropriation. As suggested above, this conclusion is predicated in the intuitive assertion that governments should not expect private commercial enterprises to pursue policies that are based upon irrational decisions.
II Risk-aversion and the Decision to Invest in Environmental Precaution
In addition to determining whether or not the regulation should be viewed as an unfair interference and therefore engage the obligation to compensate, the formula discloses a Disproportion Factor, which indicates the extent to which the expenditure on protection exceeds the expected loss. The expected loss, that is to say the potential loss multiplied by its probability of occurrence, is the amount that the company should be prepared to spend based purely on a standard cost-benefit analysis.
However it may well be rational for the company to adopt a greater degree of aversion to risk and hence spend more than this minimum amount.
The Disproportion Factor model focuses on the role of risk-aversion in the decision-making process of company managers, which for the purposes of this article are taken to be foreign investors. Risk-aversion expresses the degree to which a decision-maker is unwilling to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with a more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff. For example, a risk-averse investor might choose to put his savings into a bank account with a low but guaranteed interest rate, whereas someone who has a lower level of The assessment of decisions relating to environmental precaution is rooted in the logic of utility, meaning the total satisfaction received from consuming a good or service. Utility is a means of analysis that is used widely in public planning as a means of interpreting public preferences. 33 The application of utility theory to decision-making for the purpose of environmental protection is achieved by identifying four factors (ABCD) in a process often described as the ABCD model. 34 A represents the total assets of the organization that is deciding whether or not to implement an environmental safety precaution. For the purposes of this application of the model, the organization is a foreign investor and A will represent those assets that may be drawn upon to compensate for environmental damage in the country hosting the industrial plant. These may be the assets of a national subsidiary, but the total assets of the international company might be considered in some cases, such as BP's Macondo oil release, because the company has such a major interest in the nation concerned. B is the sum that the environmental protection system will cost that will 381 (2010) reduce the probability of incurring the environmental costs from one larger figure to another smaller one, where the probability of the harm occurring is typically already small. Clearly the B figure is derived from engineering as well as financial assessment, which for the purposes of this analysis is presumed to be an accurate representation of the economic costs and risk. Thus the functionality of the formula is predicated on the assumption that real costs and risks can be fairly accurately measured. B can stand for "balancing" as it balances the expenditure in precaution against the reduction in risk of harm, the crucial proportionality exercise associated with assessing the legitimacy of a host state's laws. C is the total environmental harm costs associated with the lack of implementation of the precaution system being considered. Again this figure will be derived from an economic analysis of the adverse effects suffered, which are taken as fully capturing the magnitude of the damage both to the firm and to society.
The D portion of the formula denotes the difference in the expected utilities of the organization's wealth with and without the protection system. The utility of the organization's assets may simply be linear, meaning that it may be regarded as identical to their monetary value. This corresponds to "risk neutrality", meaning that the organization's decision-makers will be concerned simply with maximising the organization's wealth. Increasing the value expressed for the organisation's riskaversion will tend to make it less reluctant to invest in a protection system. It is important to recognize that risk-aversion is not a static value. It will change for the same individual decision-maker according to the costs and benefits associated with the particular decision with which he is faced. But even at high levels of risk-aversion the decision-maker will choose to pursue the safety investment only when the scheme is relatively close to financial break-even. For such borderline schemes, where the cost is close to the benefit, the amount the organisation is prepared to spend on the protection system will tend to rise as the risk-aversion increases. This reflects the fear of bearing the financial and other burdens associated with a large environmental disaster. The ratio of the cost of the protection scheme that would be sanctioned at a given risk-aversion to the expected loss in its absence is identified as the Limiting Risk Multiplier, the maximum value of which is governed by the maximum feasible value of risk-aversion.
Appreciating the mental state of the decision-maker is crucial to understanding the value of this formula. Accordingly, it must be recognized that increasing the decision maker's risk-aversion will reduce the clarity, or rationality, of the process of choosing whether or not to undertake the safety precaution. As a result, the capacity for discrimination between the two options will gradually diminish, being lost altogether at what has been called the Point of Indiscriminate Decision. At this level of risk-aversion the decision maker will be able to distinguish neither advantage in installing the scheme nor disadvantage in installing its inverse, a hypothetical "danger system" that would actually lead to environmental harm. The Point of Indiscriminate Decision provides a natural upper limit for the value of risk-aversion. This bounds the Limiting Risk Multiplier in turn, and so sets an objective upper amount that it is rational to spend on an environmental protection system. This is the level of spend that should be expected by the environmental law of the relevant jurisdiction.
The formula yields further valuable insight into the decision-making process of the foreign investor. At any risk-aversion level greater than zero (meaning that the decision-maker will apply more caution that he would than if he were trying merely to maximise wealth), the utility of wealth increases at a decreasing rate to the point that additional wealth results in limited additional utility. Successive increments of utility tend to decline sharply in proportion to the total wealth saved, meaning that a business will value initial savings greater than later ones of the same monetary value (saving 10,000 euros rather than 0 will matter more than saving 90,000 euros instead of 80,000 euros). 35 This effect becomes more pronounced the higher the level of riskaversion, and, as a result, an improvement in utility level brought about by a moneysaving strategy will become very difficult to distinguish at a very high level of riskaversion.
Company decision-makers will obviously seek to maximize their company's expected utility. This means that they will generally want to implement the environmental protection scheme if the scheme's cost is outweighed by the increase in expected utility it brings about. This will occur when the expected before-and-after utility difference (the D variable) is negative -the expected utility after implementation will be greater than the expected utility in the absence of the protection scheme. This means that the environmental precaution is expected to increase the value of the company's assets. Reluctance to spend on environmental precaution is directly linked to the expected impact on the value of the company's assets. Again, this reveals the type of decision that should be viewed as conforming to national environmental laws.
Taking the company decision-maker's initial position as one of scepticism as to the usefulness of the environmental precaution, the reluctance to invest in the precaution can be defined by reference to the ratio between the expected before-andafter utility difference (D in the ABCD model) to the starting utility measured relative to one unit of money. "Reluctance to invest" is a mathematically defined variable that simply provides a convenient scale by which to judge the motivation to invest in a protection system. A 100 per cent reluctance to invest in the precaution, the equivalent of an outright refusal or unwillingness to do so, will be associated with a protection system that is so expensive that it is expected to reduce the utility of the company's assets to zero. A negative reluctance to invest will suggest an openness to investment in a protection scheme. However, psychologists note that:
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There are two problems of behavior which any theory of motivation must come to grips with. ... The first problem is to account for an individual's selection of one path of action among a set of possible alternatives. The second problem is to account for the amplitude or vigor of the action tendency once it is initiated, and for its tendency to persist for a time in a given direction.
The variable, reluctance to invest, reflects these two key features of decision making..
Thus an increase in risk-aversion may cause the reluctance to invest to go from positive to negative, but the "amplitude or vigor of the action tendency" will decrease at the same time. At some point, when the risk-aversion has reached a very high value, the "amplitude of the action tendency" will be so small that the ideal, rational decision maker will be unable to detect it and hence would feel no enthusiasm to implement the precaution. In such circumstances laws requiring the relevant precaution should be viewed as illegitimate or unreasonable.
Companies should and will become more willing to spend money to avoid disasters as they become more worried about the consequences of not doing so. If the use of the ABCD model suggests that a rational investor facing the decision to invest would be motivated to do so, both as regards the direction of the decision and the amplitude of the action tendency, then any environmental regulation requiring this 36 J. W. Atkinson, 'Motivational Determinants of Risk-Taking Behaviour', 64:6 Psychological Review 359 (1957) investment should be tolerated by the company even if the Disproportion Factor is greater than unity.
Where the expected payoff from installing protection is high, meaning that the environmental precaution is expected to save the investor money (equivalent to adding to the company's expected utility, measured at a risk-aversion of zero), increasing the company's risk-aversion above zero will not change the orientation of the decision maker towards the implementation of the precaution. However, it will decrease his motivation to do so because of the increasing difficulty noted earlier in distinguishing utility improvements as the level of risk-aversion becomes higher. The "amplitude or vigor of the action tendency" will be at a very low level. As suggested above, at some value of risk-aversion, the company decision makers will be unable to see the benefit of even an environmental precaution that can be expected to save their firm money. This mathematical result from utility theory may be explained intuitively as describing the situation where the decision makers become so enveloped in gloom that they do not believe that any action will make a difference -even a system of good value (cost relative to level of prevention) will not assuage their fears.
For protection schemes that are clearly of poor value, meaning that the monetary cost to the company now outweighs the financial benefits in terms of probability and magnitude of environmental harm as assessed, a similar phenomenon will occur as risk-aversion increases. Now the disbenefit, seen very sharply at a riskaversion of zero (when only the money matters), will lose clarity as the risk-aversion level of the decision maker increases. Again, at some high level of risk-aversion, the company decision makers will be unable to distinguish the disbenefit of abolishing an environmental precaution that can be expected to save their firm money. Intuitively the decision makers may be imagined to be enveloped in the same despair described above, and will feel that, since no action on their part is going to make much if any difference, it does not matter what action they chose. It is clear that no rational investor should allow his risk-aversion to reach the level where he was unable to distinguish between the merits of a scheme that increased protection and one that diminishes protection for the environment.
III Point of Indiscriminate Decision, Permission Point and Excessively

Disproportionate Expenditure
The ABCD analysis indicates that there is a level of risk-aversion at which the investor will have to make a decision (because doing nothing is still a decision) but will be unable to discriminate amongst any of the options available to him because to him there is no measurable difference. This is described as the Point of Indiscriminate Decision and it means that the decision taken at this level of riskaversion is not related to any rational process. At this point the decision to implement the protection measure or not will be essentially random. This condition can be observed in individuals who enter a state of panic -perceptions are distorted and rational control over decisions is lost. No decision-maker should raise his riskaversion to the point of indiscriminate decision or beyond because this will mean that he is not assessing options rationally but rather exhibiting a random, thoughtless response. Determining the maximum rational risk-aversion sets an upper bound on the Disproportion Factor, and so sets an objective upper limit on the amount that it is rational to spend on an environmental protection system. Thus any domestic laws calling for precautions in excess of this level should be viewed as manifestations of indirect expropriation.
Given a protection scheme of given cost, the rational decision maker will mull over the decision on whether or not to implement by varying his risk-aversion to find the value at which he experiences the minimum reluctance to invest. This value is known as the "permission point". If his minimum reluctance is now negative and the permission point is less than the point of indiscriminate decision, then the protection scheme should be implemented. This will include cases where the Disproportion Factor is greater than unity. If, however, the cost of the protection scheme is higher than the maximum rational cost, which is the product of the Disproportion Factor and the expected loss, then the cost is excessively disproportionate. The excess may be quantified precisely as the cost minus the maximum rational cost. Thus a level of compensation for the expropriation can be established.
IV The Disproportion Factor Model and Investment Arbitration: A Hypothetical Example
The operation of the Disproportion Factor Model in the sphere of international investment arbitration is best illustrated through an example. An electricity company from the fictional state of Ruristan, Protopower, has just finished building a nuclear reactor in Germany to supply electricity to the local population. Ruristan and Germany concluded an IIA that is the same as the text in the 2008 German Model BIT. Given widespread fears regarding nuclear energy in the aftermath of the Japanese tsunami, the German government subsequently conducts an environmental impact statement and imposes a requirement on Protopower that it should build a tertiary containment structure costing 200 million euros to reduce the frequency of a large release of radioactive contaminant from a conservatively assessed current figure of one in a 100 thousand years to one in a 100 million years. The plant lifetime is 60 years, and the estimated environmental cost of such a release, should it happen, is 20 billion euros. Assessing the financial impact of the regulation and the potential risk that the associated environmental precaution could prevent, Protopower takes into account the fact that its German subsidiary has total assets of 21 billion euros that it can draw on to provide compensation if necessary, and the growth rate of that subsidiary has averaged 4 per cent per annum for the past 10 years.
The maximum sensible spend to achieve this reduction in accident probability is given by the equation drawn from the work of Thomas and Jones 37 for the riskneutral case. The basis of this calculation is to equate the additional expenditure on the safety system with the reduction in the expected cost of an accident. The maximum sensible spend to implement this safety scheme ( Z  ) is given by the product of the Limiting Risk Multiplier ( R M ) and the maximum cost of the scheme in
For the risk-neutral case, the maximum that should be spent on the scheme is equal to the reduction in expected accident costs. In the limiting case of zero growth, this risk-neutral spend is simply expressed 
where the probability of there being no accident in the interval T is although the assets will be reduced by this amount, the expected cost of the accident will also be reduced. The expected utility after implementation of the scheme is then
The maximum that should be spent on the safety system occurs when the expected utility does not change after implementing the scheme, viz.
for the risk-neutral case, the maximum rational cost is 
The utility function is taken to be that of Atkinson (A. B. Atkinson, 'On the measurement of inequality' J. Econ. Theory, 2, 244, (1970) 
where W is the wealth of the organisation and  is the elasticity of marginal utility or "riskaversion." The reluctance to invest can be expressed as 
Protopower concludes therefore that it does not wish to implement the measure at a cost of 200 million euros.
Wishing to continue operating in Germany, Protopower instigates the environmental precaution as required under the law and against its better judgment, demanding compensation from the government for the cost by asserting that the measure was a form of regulatory expropriation. The German government refuses to pay, stating that the law was a reasonable exercise of regulatory discretion for the purposes of protecting the environment from radiation. Pursuant to Art 10 of the Germany-Ruristan bilateral investment treaty, Protopower brings a claim in international arbitration against Germany at ICSID. Their claim is based on Germany's alleged violation of Art 4(2) of the treaty, guaranteeing that there will be no expropriation of foreign investors' assets without full compensation. The question falling to the arbitration tribunal is first, whether or not the regulation dictating that the safety precaution on the nuclear power plant investment should be viewed as unreasonable and therefore a measure tantamount to expropriation. If the measure is not viewed as an act of expropriation, then no compensation is payable to Protopower by the German government. Secondly, in the event that the answer to the first question is that the regulation is not reasonable and therefore does constitute a form of indirect expropriation, the tribunal must determine the level at which compensation 43 ibid should be set to compensate the investor for the loss of value of their assets, namely the nuclear plant.
Given that the required spend exceeds the maximum that rational decision maker should be willing to spend, the environmental regulation should be viewed by an investment tribunal as grossly disproportionate and therefore an act of expropriation. Secondly, the amount of compensation due to the investor would consist of the extent to which the regulation was unreasonable, meaning that it imposed costs that did not lead to justifiable outputs in terms of environmental protection. By the Disproportion Factor Model, the maximum amount that is would have been reasonable to ask Protopower to spend on extra protection would have been 16 million euros. Therefore Protopower should be entitled to 200 million euros − 16 million euros = 184 million euros in compensation.
V Conclusion
Applying utility theory together with the auxiliary concepts of the Point of Indiscriminate Decision and the Permission Point, the Disproportion Factor model offers a mathematical justification for the concept of gross disproportion with respect to protection systems to guard against environmental loss. This method is important because the concept of regulatory expropriation in international investment law, is informed by this often highly discretionary consideration, an assessment of which falls to international arbitration tribunals as the specified for a for the resolution of disputes brought under IIAs. The Disproportion Factor model, which can be applied without the need for a sophisticated understanding of the underlying mathematical calculations, can provide useful guidance to investment arbitrators in the determination of whether regulations imposed by host states against foreign investors should be viewed as indirect expropriations. It therefore clarifies whether there is an obligation on the part of the host state to pay compensation, or whether their regulatory actions should be viewed as legitimate exercises of governmental authority necessary to ensure environmental safety. Perhaps even more valuable is the Disproportion Factor's contribution to the gauging of an appropriate quantum of compensation. Rather than simply issuing a binary result of reasonable or unreasonable, the method yields a measurement of the degree of unreasonableness of a particular regulation relative to its costs and benefits, which can be readily adapted to disclose a total level of monetary compensation. The logic of the formula is that foreign investors, as with any private citizens, should not be forced to engage in behaviour that they would choose not to, were they fully informed of the costs to themselves and to society of their actions, and able to make the decision rationally.
The ABCD model simulates the actions of a rational decision maker, and thus acts as an idealised proxy for the decision maker in the organisation in question. It is presumed that no person should be forced by law to act in an irrational way.
Whether a regulation that required a Disproportion Factor non-compliant spend might also be viewed as a breach of other international investment law protections, such as the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard seen in many IIAs in addition to indirect expropriation has not been examined here. The threshold for fair and equitable treatment violations is usually seen as a high one. For example, the tribunal in Saluka v Czech Republic stated that fair and equitable treatment requires that the host state "will not act in a way that is manifestly inconsistent, nontransparent (i.e. unrelated to some rational policy) or discriminatory (based on unjustifiable distinctions)." 
